Topic-pollution control

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 A policy that involves the government imposing quantitative limits on the amount of pollution firms are allowed to emit, or requiring firms to install specific pollution control devices.

- The government establishes an allowable amount of emissions.
- Emissions permits are distributed.
- Firms can trade emissions permits.
 - Firms with high costs of reducing pollution will buy permits form firms with low costs of reducing pollution, ensuring that pollution is reduced at the lowest possible cost.
- Hence the market is used to achieve efficient pollution reduction.

- In 1990, Congress enacted a cap-and-trade system for sulfur dioxide emissions.
 - Improvements in pollution reduction technology resulted, with the cost of compliance ending up almost 90 percent less than firm initially estimated.
 - This program was very effective, with benefits at least 25 times the cost of implementing the program

By 2013, the program had effectively ended. Why?

- Further emissions reductions were needed. President Bush attempted to lower the cap, but Congress resisted.
- As a result, the EPA decided to return to a command-to-control approach in order to achieve the reduction.

While cap-and-trade appears to be very effective, any policy needs political backing to have a chance at success.

Environmentalists object to cap-and-trade as it gives firms "licenses to pollute".

- But pollution has a benefit: it allows cheap production.
- Every production decision uses up some scare resource: time, natural resources, clean air, etc.
- In this sense, paying for using the clean air seems appropriate.

Another serious concern is that cap-and-trade may produce hot-spots, locations where a lot of pollution takes place.

• This would be the case if the firms with high costs of pollution reduction were geographically close.

Cap-and-trade alters who pays for pollution:

- When pollution is unregulated, all consumers bear the consequences of pollution.
- When cap-and-trade is enacted, the cost of pollution is borne directly by firms.

Polluting firms tend to be able to organize better lobbying efforts, because consumers feel the cost of pollution diffusely.

 This illustrates the classic special-interest problem in politics: small groups are better able to organize than large groups, even when the large groups might benefit a lot from organizing.